18 ideas
10825 | The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H] |
10820 | In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H] |
13499 | Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD] |
10818 | Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H] |
10817 | Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H] |
10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
10801 | Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine] |
10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H] |
10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
10827 | Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H] |
10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
10826 | 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H] |
10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |
7615 | Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam] |