17 ideas
5745 | Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine] |
8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine] |
16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
16965 | All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine] |
16963 | Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine] |
16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
4216 | Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe] |
18966 | Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine] |
14490 | You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine] |
16961 | In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine] |
5673 | If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam] |
5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |
5671 | Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam] |
5672 | Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam] |
5675 | Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam] |
5674 | We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam] |
20919 | How can things without weight compose weight? [Alexander] |