9 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 13472 | Hilbert aimed to eliminate number from geometry [Hilbert, by Hart,WD] |
| 9546 | Euclid axioms concerns possibilities of construction, but Hilbert's assert the existence of objects [Hilbert, by Chihara] |
| 18742 | Hilbert's formalisation revealed implicit congruence axioms in Euclid [Hilbert, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18217 | Hilbert's geometry is interesting because it captures Euclid without using real numbers [Hilbert, by Field,H] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 2667 | A false object might give the same presentation as a true one [Arcesilaus, by Cicero] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |