Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types', 'Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking)' and 'On What Grounds What'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
18170 The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10502 We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
18258 We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
16784 Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
10499 We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
10501 A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
10500 No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]