27 ideas
| 8996 | If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine] |
| 21918 | Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 8995 | Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine] |
| 10064 | Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave] |
| 20296 | Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey] |
| 8998 | Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine] |
| 8999 | Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine] |
| 9000 | If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine] |
| 8994 | If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine] |
| 8997 | There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine] |
| 8993 | If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine] |
| 21920 | No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 21362 | Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
| 21361 | For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
| 21919 | Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
| 21917 | The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 21921 | Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 21363 | Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer] |
| 8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
| 8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
| 8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
| 8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
| 8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
| 8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
| 8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
| 8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
| 8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |