12 ideas
8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |
7076 | Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley] |