Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', 'Perception' and 'Lectures on the Philosophy of Right'

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
1627 Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
1623 Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
9204 Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17738 Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
19492 Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
1628 If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
10929 Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12188 Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
15090 Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
7630 Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9383 Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
12424 Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9338 Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
9337 Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
9340 Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
7632 Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
7635 Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7638 One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund]
7642 The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
7640 Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund]
7641 Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
1620 Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
1629 Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
19488 The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
1625 Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
7637 Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
1626 It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
7317 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
1621 Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
9371 Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
21785 We are only free, with rights, if we claim our freedom, and there are no natural rights [Hegel, by Houlgate]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
22041 Representatives by region ignores whether they care about the national interest [Hegel, by Pinkard]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
21781 The absolute right is the right to have rights [Hegel]