Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Structure and Nature', 'Letters to Oldenburg' and 'On What Grounds What'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
God is a being with infinite attributes, each of them infinite or perfect [Spinoza]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Trying to prove God's existence through miracles is proving the obscure by the more obscure [Spinoza]