31 ideas
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
4869 | Experience does not teach us any essences of things [Spinoza] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |