37 ideas
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |