18 ideas
13010 | In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine] |
9002 | Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine] |
13681 | Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider] |
13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
9003 | Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine] |
13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
9004 | If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine] |
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
9006 | Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
9001 | Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |