Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology', 'Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic' and 'Things'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science

22153

Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic

22329

Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

19485

Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers

19486

We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta

7783	Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe]

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind

21569

It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell]

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic

19487

Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]