14 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
| 12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
| 12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
| 12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 21500 | We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI] |
| 21501 | If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI] |
| 6556 | If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI] |
| 21498 | Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI] |
| 5828 | Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI] |
| 10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |