12 ideas
| 6564 | To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not' [Quine] |
| 14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
| 5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
| 5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
| 5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
| 5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
| 5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
| 5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
| 14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
| 14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
| 14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |