39 ideas
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
7807 | The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra] |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
9618 | Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
9830 | Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
17265 | Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
9185 | Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
22276 | Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter] |
17264 | Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
12232 | A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano] |
12233 | The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |