Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematical Logic (revised)', 'The Nature of Mathematics' and 'On Copernicanism and Relativity of Motion'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]