19 ideas
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
12221 | 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine] |
19321 | We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |