14 ideas
7855 | Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau] |
12066 | Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt] |
12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
12082 | If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt] |
12089 | Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt] |
12102 | Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt] |
18969 | How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine] |
6120 | Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane] |
6121 | There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane] |
6122 | No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane] |
18967 | A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine] |
18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
12085 | Reality is directional [Witt] |
18970 | The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine] |