Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology', 'Rationale and Maxims in Study of Concepts' and 'Against the Mathematicians'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22153 Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
19485 Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
19486 We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
20795 Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
20794 How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
11127 If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
19487 Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]