17 ideas
| 2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 19043 | Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine] |
| 2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
| 19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
| 9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
| 9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
| 9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
| 9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
| 2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
| 2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
| 2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
| 2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
| 2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
| 2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |