Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth by Convention', 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' and 'Testability and Meaning'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
8996 If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
8995 Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10064 Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
20296 Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey]
8998 Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine]
8999 Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine]
9000 If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
8994 If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
8997 There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8993 If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14305 In the truth-functional account a burnt-up match was soluble because it never entered water [Carnap]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]