45 ideas
| 16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
| 8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
| 8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
| 8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
| 8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
| 8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
| 8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
| 8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
| 16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
| 8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
| 8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
| 16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
| 8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
| 16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
| 16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
| 16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
| 8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
| 16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
| 16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
| 16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
| 4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
| 4880 | Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett] |
| 4873 | What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett] |
| 16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
| 16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
| 8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
| 16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
| 4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
| 4875 | We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett] |
| 4879 | There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett] |
| 4876 | Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett] |
| 4878 | The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett] |
| 4874 | The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett] |
| 4882 | Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett] |
| 8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
| 16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
| 8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
| 8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |
| 4872 | Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett] |
| 7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
| 16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
| 16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
| 16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
| 16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
| 4877 | Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett] |