Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement', 'Finkish dispositions' and 'Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
21753 If we look at the world rationally, the world assumes a rational aspect [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
21974 The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12219 Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10922 Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15463 All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
15461 A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10923 Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
10921 Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
10924 Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
15462 Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]