11 ideas
5042 | For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz] |
12221 | 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine] |
19321 | We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |