19 ideas
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |