Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Professor Marcus', 'Models' and 'Action, Reasons and Causes'

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17 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 7. Scientific Models
Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides]
In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG]
Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides]
The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides]
'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides]
Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]