11 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 19043 | Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |