25 ideas
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |