34 ideas
| 23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
| 23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
| 23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
| 23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
| 23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
| 23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
| 9912 | There are no such things as numbers [Benacerraf] |
| 9901 | Numbers can't be sets if there is no agreement on which sets they are [Benacerraf] |
| 9151 | Benacerraf says numbers are defined by their natural ordering [Benacerraf, by Fine,K] |
| 13891 | To understand finite cardinals, it is necessary and sufficient to understand progressions [Benacerraf, by Wright,C] |
| 17904 | A set has k members if it one-one corresponds with the numbers less than or equal to k [Benacerraf] |
| 17906 | To explain numbers you must also explain cardinality, the counting of things [Benacerraf] |
| 9898 | We can count intransitively (reciting numbers) without understanding transitive counting of items [Benacerraf] |
| 17903 | Someone can recite numbers but not know how to count things; but not vice versa [Benacerraf] |
| 9897 | The application of a system of numbers is counting and measurement [Benacerraf] |
| 9900 | For Zermelo 3 belongs to 17, but for Von Neumann it does not [Benacerraf] |
| 9899 | The successor of x is either x and all its members, or just the unit set of x [Benacerraf] |
| 8697 | Disputes about mathematical objects seem irrelevant, and mathematicians cannot resolve them [Benacerraf, by Friend] |
| 8304 | No particular pair of sets can tell us what 'two' is, just by one-to-one correlation [Benacerraf, by Lowe] |
| 9906 | If ordinal numbers are 'reducible to' some set-theory, then which is which? [Benacerraf] |
| 9907 | If any recursive sequence will explain ordinals, then it seems to be the structure which matters [Benacerraf] |
| 9908 | The job is done by the whole system of numbers, so numbers are not objects [Benacerraf] |
| 9909 | The number 3 defines the role of being third in a progression [Benacerraf] |
| 9911 | Number words no more have referents than do the parts of a ruler [Benacerraf] |
| 8925 | Mathematical objects only have properties relating them to other 'elements' of the same structure [Benacerraf] |
| 9938 | How can numbers be objects if order is their only property? [Benacerraf, by Putnam] |
| 9910 | Number-as-objects works wholesale, but fails utterly object by object [Benacerraf] |
| 9903 | Number words are not predicates, as they function very differently from adjectives [Benacerraf] |
| 9904 | The set-theory paradoxes mean that 17 can't be the class of all classes with 17 members [Benacerraf] |
| 23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
| 14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
| 9905 | Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf] |
| 23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
| 23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |