48 ideas
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
7113 | Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre] |
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
7112 | The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre] |
7114 | The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre] |
7119 | Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
7122 | We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre] |
7125 | A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre] |
7108 | The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre] |
7111 | Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre] |
22226 | Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle] |
7107 | Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre] |
7109 | If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre] |
7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
7117 | How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre] |
7123 | Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre] |
22225 | My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre] |
7124 | The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre] |
7116 | When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre] |
7120 | It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre] |
7110 | If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre] |
7115 | Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre] |
7121 | The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |