40 ideas
14027 | If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus] |
14040 | Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus] |
14028 | Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus] |
14029 | If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus] |
14030 | The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus] |
14048 | Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus] |
14044 | The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus] |
14045 | Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus] |
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
14046 | A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus] |
14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
14047 | Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus] |
14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
14039 | Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus] |
14050 | We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus] |
14037 | Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus] |
6010 | Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak] |
14041 | The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus] |
14042 | The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus] |
14032 | Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus] |
14033 | Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus] |
14034 | There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus] |
14035 | Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus] |
14038 | There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus] |
14049 | We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus] |
14043 | The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus] |
14031 | Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus] |
14036 | There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus] |