28 ideas
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
13074 | Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
7563 | The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |