100 ideas
14888 | Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche] |
14863 | Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche] |
14890 | Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche] |
14861 | Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche] |
14885 | The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche] |
14887 | You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche] |
14889 | Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche] |
14862 | Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche] |
14876 | Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche] |
14878 | It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche] |
14881 | Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche] |
14860 | Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
14859 | If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche] |
8625 | What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill] |
14880 | Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche] |
17895 | Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill] |
10427 | All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill] |
4944 | Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke] |
7762 | Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan] |
16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
9801 | Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill] |
8742 | The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro] |
9800 | Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill] |
5201 | Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer] |
9360 | If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill] |
9888 | Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill] |
9794 | There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill] |
9796 | Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill] |
9795 | Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill] |
9798 | Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill] |
9797 | '2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill] |
9799 | 3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill] |
9802 | Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill] |
9803 | We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill] |
9804 | Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill] |
9805 | 12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill] |
8741 | Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill] |
12411 | Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill] |
5656 | Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill] |
9624 | Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR] |
14869 | If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche] |
16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
9806 | Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill] |
11156 | The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill] |
12190 | Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill] |
22623 | Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill] |
14875 | Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche] |
14866 | It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche] |
16859 | Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill] |
9082 | Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill] |
14872 | Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche] |
14879 | The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche] |
16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
16860 | Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill] |
16843 | Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton] |
16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
16845 | The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill] |
16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
17086 | Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben] |
17091 | Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben] |
16805 | Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton] |
16835 | The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton] |
14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
14868 | Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche] |
9079 | We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill] |
16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
9081 | We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill] |
16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
14870 | We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche] |
14867 | It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche] |
9078 | The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill] |
9080 | General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill] |
16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
14884 | The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche] |
14886 | Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche] |
14883 | We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche] |
14882 | Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche] |
7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
14865 | We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche] |
8345 | A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill] |
10391 | Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill] |
14547 | The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill] |
8377 | Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill] |
14545 | A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill] |
16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
4773 | Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos] |
4775 | In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos] |
4776 | In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos] |
14871 | Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche] |
9417 | What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill] |
14864 | The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche] |