8 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
21687 | It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience [Quine] |
21688 | There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories [Quine] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
20957 | We don't choose our characters, yet we still claim credit for the actions our characters perform [Schelling] |