28 ideas
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
21733 | The right-wing conception of freedom is based on the idea of self-ownership [Cohen,GA] |
21739 | Plenty of people have self-ownership, but still lack autonomy [Cohen,GA] |
21734 | It is plausible that no one has an initial right to own land and natural resources [Cohen,GA] |
21736 | It is doubtful whether any private property was originally acquired legitimately [Cohen,GA] |
21735 | Every thing which is now private started out as unowned [Cohen,GA] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |