14 ideas
| 14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
| 8361 | What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv] |
| 8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8363 | p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv] |
| 8364 | We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv] |
| 8366 | The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv] |
| 8362 | We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv] |
| 8360 | We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv] |
| 8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8365 | Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv] |