10 ideas
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
21799 | We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen] |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |