15 ideas
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
| 22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
| 22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
| 22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
| 22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
| 22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
| 22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
| 22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
| 2596 | Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
| 22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
| 2595 | If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz] |