Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Existence and Quantification', 'Hilbert's Programme' and 'A Priori'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


26 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe]
Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel]
Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares]