Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Natural Kinds', 'Letters to Pierre Bayle' and 'Transworld Heir Lines'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]