Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement', 'Paper of December 1676' and 'Mathematics is Megethology'

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17 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
10807 Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
10809 We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis]
10812 The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis]
10811 The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
10813 What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis]
10814 Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10806 Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12219 Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
10816 We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10922 Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
10808 Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10815 We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10810 I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10923 Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
10921 Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
10924 Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
12727 It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz]