12 ideas
| 12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
| 16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
| 16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
| 16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
| 16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |
| 16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
| 16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
| 10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
| 10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
| 10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
| 19384 | Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz] |