Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement', 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws)' and 'Events'

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21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis]