Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement', 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws)' and 'Why Medieval Philosophy Matters'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22138 Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12219 Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
13733 Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10922 Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
9874 Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
18252 Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
18271 We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
10623 Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
9975 Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
18165 My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
22134 Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10923 Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
10921 Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
22150 Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
10924 Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22139 Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
22136 Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
22135 Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9190 A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
13665 Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
22152 Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22156 The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter]