12 ideas
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 4577 | There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 21236 | Instead of gravitational force, we now have a pervasive gravitational field [Farmelo] |
| 21235 | The Schrödinger waves are just the maths of transforming energy values to positions [Farmelo] |
| 21234 | Experiments show that fundamental particles of one type are identical [Farmelo] |