14 ideas
8251 | The logical space of reasons is a natural phenomenon, and it is the realm of freedom [McDowell] |
12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
13856 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington] |
8948 | The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher] |
13767 | Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice] |
14277 | A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington] |
8128 | Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge] |
19092 | There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth] |
8253 | Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell] |
8254 | Forming concepts by abstraction from the Given is private definition, which the Private Lang. Arg. attacks [McDowell] |