Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Structure and Nature', 'Logic and Conversation' and 'Ontology and Mathematical Truth'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine]
The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien]
If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien]
Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington]
The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher]
Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]