Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Hellman', 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person' and 'Truth and Meaning'

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13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
7332 There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9379 A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264 Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
9266 A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267 Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
7772 Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
7327 Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
7769 You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6179 Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20015 Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]