Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reply to Hellman', 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person' and 'Reference and Essence: seven appendices'

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10 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
14742 It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9379 A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264 Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
9266 A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267 Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
18885 Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20015 Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]