11 ideas
21355 | The Pre-Socratics are not simple naturalists, because they do not always 'leave the gods out' [Leroi] |
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |